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Abstract
Using a national panel of housing units, this paper documents that the rate of nominal rigidity in housing
rents is high in Turkey between 2008 and 2011. We find that, on average, 31.5 percent of the rents did
not change from year to year in nominal terms. We then ask if the incidence of nominal rigidity depends
on the turnover status of the housing unit. We show that 35.4 percent of the nonturnover units had rigid
rents, while for only 17.1 percent of the turnover units rents did not change. We also present evidence
that grid pricing is associated with more than half of the nominal rigidity in housing rents in our sample.
The household- and individual-level determinants of the nominal rigidity in rents and turnover status
are also investigated using the micro-level details available in our dataset. We document that, relative
to the low-income tenants, high-income tenants are less likely to have rigid rents and they are also less
likely to change units frequently. This finding suggests that search and moving costs impose frictions that
amplify the opportunity costs of high-income tenants; thus, they are more likely to agree on reasonable
rent increases for the purpose of saving time and reducing emotional stress.
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1 Introduction
Price adjustments are sluggish. This is a well-documented fact across time/sectors/countries
and for a wide variety of products. For example, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) show, using
comprehensive micro-level data from the US retail establishments, that the median duration
of a price is approximately 4 months—7 months after excluding sales. The duration is around
15 months at the 90th percentile. Observed patterns of price changes provide empirical foun-
dations for the New Keynesian macro models, which mostly rely on the assumption that prices
exhibit a certain degree of stickiness.1 These models are designed for analyzing the short-run
real effects of monetary shocks, which would not be easy to obtain without nominal price
rigidities. Thus, quantifying and explaining the magnitude of price stickiness is important for
refining our understanding of the real effects of monetary policy.
A particularly important price category to examine the degree of nominal rigidity is housing
rents. Documenting stickiness in housing rents is critical for three main reasons. First, rents
constitute a significant fraction of the household budget. For example, for the renters in the
US, rent expenditures represent around 20–30 percent of yearly income [Genesove (2003)].2
Among the renters in Turkey between 2008–2011 (which is also the sample we work with),
yearly housing rent expenditures constitute a little less than half of the yearly income of the
household head and around 30 percent of the annual household income. Second, the market for
housing rentals has certain characteristics setting it apart from the market for ordinary goods
such as supermarket goods. The most obvious one is that ordinary goods have a fixed price
tag applying equally to all customers. Housing rents, however, can be tailored to a particular
tenant based on the landlord’s subjective and objective evaluations.3 These evaluations might
be based on whether the tenant is a new one or a continuing one, i.e., turnover matters a
lot. Another is that housing rents are subject to contracts, which is an additional source
1See Calvo (1983) for an example of time-dependent reasoning, i.e., only a certain fraction of prices change in any given time
period. There is also a large literature explaining staggering with the existence of small menu costs implying state dependency
rather than time dependency [e.g., Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel (1991), Caplin
and Leahy (1991), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Gertler and Leahy (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), and Midrigan (2011)].
2Many of the early empirical work on price rigidities focus on items constituting only a tiny share of household budget. For
example, Cecchetti (1986) uses newsstand magazines, Kashyap (1995) focuses on catalog items such as chamois shirts and fishing
rods, and Lach and Tsiddon (1996) work with data on wine, fish, and meat products.
3This also implies that supermarket goods are subject to menu costs, while housing rents are not.
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of price rigidity. Third, the determination of housing rents involves a considerable amount
of additional costs such as negotiation and information acquisition costs. In the presence of
these costs, the nominal price in the previous period serves as a good benchmark for those
parties who are not willing to bear these costs.
Our main purpose in this paper is to quantify and explain the magnitude of nominal rigidity in
housing rents. We use a new dataset from Turkey for the 2008–2011 period, which is a national
panel of housing units providing rich information on housing rents along with a comprehensive
set of household- and individual-level characteristics.4 We present three main findings. First,
we find that, on average, 31.5 percent of the rents did not change from year to year in nominal
terms. We then ask if the incidence of nominal rigidity depends on the turnover status of the
housing unit. Performing pairwise comparisons across the years in our sample, we show that
21.4 percent of the units in our sample experienced a turnover (i.e., had a new tenant) in the
following year. We further show that 35.4 percent of the nonturnover units had rigid rents,
whereas for only 17.1 percent of the turnover units rents did not change; thus, turnover status
is an important determinant of nominal rigidity in rents. Finally, we present evidence that
grid pricing can be associated with 68 percent of the observed nominal rigidity in housing
rents in our sample. In other words, the tendency to round rents to the nearest multiple of
10, 25, 50, and 100 can explain a significant fraction of rent stickiness.
We also investigate the household- and individual-level determinants of the rigidities in rents
and turnover status. We find that the education level of the household head does not play
a systematic role on these two outcomes. However, the annual income and employment sta-
tus of the household head have some interesting implications on the degree of rigidities and
turnover. We show that being employed reduces the probability of rigidity and the proba-
bility of turnover. We also show that the yearly income of the household head is negatively
correlated with the probability of rigidity and the probability of turnover. Moreover, being
married, older, and living in a more populated household reduces the probability of turnover,
4The dataset is called the Income and Living Conditions Longitudinal Survey 2008–2011 compiled by the Turkish Statistical
Institute. See Section 2 for more detailed information on the dataset along with some institutional background about the market
for rental units in Turkey.
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while they do not have any impact on the probability of rigidity.
There is a large empirical literature on price rigidities.5 However, the literature reporting
direct evidence on rigidities in housing rents is rather small. Among the very few, Genesove
(2003) uses Annual Housing Survey 1974–1981 panel data to document that 29 percent of the
rental units in the US had no yearly change in nominal rents. Hoffmann and Kurz-Kim (2006)
show, using German data for the period 1998–2003, that the longest price durations are found
for housing rents. There is another literature comparing the ex ante user cost of housing
with actual rents and arguing that, on average, actual rents rise slower than the user cost;
thus, using actual rents rather than the user cost in the CPI accounting imposes a downward
bias on the consumer inflation [see, e.g., Dougherty and Van Order (1982), Bajari, Benkard,
and Krainer (2005), Gordon and van Goethem (2008), and Verbrugge (2008)]. Although the
papers in this literature raise rents stickiness as an important source of this gap, they do
not provide additional evidence on rent stickiness. Finally, theoretical studies incorporating
stickiness in rents include Wang and Zhou (2000) and Lai, Wang, and Yang (2007).
Our paper is very closely related to Genesove (2003). Our estimate for the degree of nominal
rigidity in housing rents, which is 31.5 percent, is very close to his estimate of 29 percent.
Genesove reports that the fraction of the turnover units in his sample is 35 percent, while ours
is only 21 percent. So, the incidence of turnover is much smaller in our study. Similar to his
results, we also document that the degree of nominal rigidity is much higher for nonturnover
units. In particular, we find that housing rents for 17.1 percent and 35.4 percent of the
observations did not change for turnover and nonturnover units, while Genesove calculates
these numbers as 14 percent and 36 percent, respectively. Genesove shows that “a little less
than half of the nominal rigidity can be ascribed to grid pricing” in the US. Our results on grid
pricing are sharper: we find that grid pricing can be associated with 68 percent of the nominal
rigidity and this number is close to 100 percent for turnover units. This suggests that, for
new tenants, there is a strong tendency for setting rents as round numbers. Unlike Genesove,
5Recent studies include Baharad and Eden (2004), Bils and Klenow (2004), Levy and Young (2004), Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy,
Dutta, and Bergen (2004), Baudry, Le Bihan, Sevestre, and Tarrieu (2007), Heidhues and Koszegi (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008), and Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009).
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we do not find any systematic relationship between rigidity and unit size or building type.
Different from Genesove’s analysis, we have access to individual-level data for the renters and
we are able to estimate the correlations between the probability of rigidity in housing rents
and various individual-level characteristics including income, education, employment status,
marital status, age, etc.
To sum up, our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, this is one of the very
few papers in the literature presenting direct evidence on housing rents. In particular, to our
knowledge, this is the first paper documenting the degree of nominal rigidity in housing rents
in a developing country using micro-level data. Second, our paper is the first to link data on
housing units to data on the corresponding household members. This enables us to examine
if rent rigidities can be explained by individual-level characteristics. Finally, this is the first
paper investigating the role of the household income level on renting behavior. We document
that high-income households are less likely to change units frequently. When the high-income
households choose not to change units, they are less likely to have rigid rents. This mechanism
suggests that search and moving costs impose frictions that amplify the opportunity costs of
high-income tenants; thus, they are more likely to agree on reasonable rent increases each year
for the purpose of saving time and reducing emotional stress.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our data and provides the institutional
details on the market for rental units in Turkey. Section 3 presents the main descriptive
results. Section 4 performs various regressions for the purpose of understanding the sources
of rigid rents. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Turkish Income and Living Conditions Survey
The Turkish Income and Living Conditions Survey (ILCS) is a publicly available and nationally
representative micro-level dataset compiled by the Turkish Statistical Institute. Major topics
that the survey focuses on include: housing, labor market status, poverty, income level, social
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exclusion, demography, and health. The ILCS datasets have been published annually since
2006 consistent with the EUROSTAT standards.6
The ILCS datasets are available in both cross-sectional and panel data formats. The cross-
sectional sample is larger than the panel data sample and, moreover, the latter is a subset of
the former. Each observation in the ILCS is assigned two ID numbers: an individual-level ID
number and an ID number for the housing unit that the individual resides in. In other words,
observations are classified at both individual level and housing unit level. This means that we
are able to map individual-level details such as age, education, employment, and income into
unit-level details such as unit size, building type, rent, etc.
We build our analysis on the housing-unit panel dataset of the ILCS. This dataset follows
housing units over time and provides information about unit characteristics, housing rents,
and characteristics of the residents. It is also possible to observe whether the residents of
the unit have changed from year to year or not—while it is not possible to trace the movers’
destinations. There are three waves of panel data compiled in four-year intervals: 2006–2009,
2007–2010, and 2008–2011. Information on actual rents is available only for the 2008–2011
wave of the survey. For this reason, we work with the 2008–2011 panel, which has 2,976
distinct households in each year of the survey.7 In each household, only the individuals of age
15 and above are surveyed.8 We restrict our sample to renters only.
Finally, we provide brief information on the sampling design of the ILCS. A multi-stage—i.e.,
stratified and cluster—sampling method is used. Household is defined as the final sampling
unit. The cross-sectional sample contains information at the region (NUTS1) and location
(urban/rural) level.9 The panel sample, however, does not provide any geographical details.
Although, as we mention above, the panel sample is a subset of the cross-sectional sample,
the ILCS does not allow linking the geographical information in the cross-sectional dataset to
6Between 2002 and 2005, information on income distribution and poverty were extracted from another survey, the Household
Budget Survey.
7The cross-sectional questionnaire is given to around 15,000 subjects, with a nonresponse rate of approximately 9 percent.
8The survey excludes the population in nursing homes, prisons, military barracks, hotels, private hospitals, and child care
centers along with the immigrant population.
9Settlements with a population of 20,000 or less are classified as rural areas, while those with 20,001 or more are classified as
urban areas.
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the panel observations. That said, we develop a method to transfer the geographical details
available in the cross-sectional sample into the panel dataset that we work with. For details,
see Section 4.2.1 and, especially, Footnote (17).
2.2 Institutional Details
In this subsection, we summarize the relevant institutional features of the market for housing
rentals in Turkey. We start with the details of the contractual arrangements between the
tenant and landlord. The Turkish real estate sector is weak in terms of the availability of
professional real estate and leasing services. In most cases, rents are determined by a direct
personal negotiation between the landlords and tenants, while the involvement rate of a real
estate agency is low. The typical contract length for rentals is one year or less.
Whether eviction is easy or difficult is important for the degree of nominal rigidity in rents.
If it is easy to evict the incumbent renters, then landlords may have incentives to evict them
for the purpose of raising rents, which may have implications for rent rigidities. Housing
markets in Turkey is regulated under the code of obligations. The code has undergone a
substantial change on July 1st 2012. The previous code was leading to conflict and duality
in implementation; the new code mostly removes these problems. Both codes are based on
the main principle of protecting tenants’ rights. Due to this protectionist nature, eviction
has never been an easy process in Turkey. Moreover, the conflicting nature of the old code
was making eviction even more difficult. The new code, joined with low professionalization
and short duration of contracts, provides some advantages to the landlord and makes eviction
relatively easier. We work with the dataset for 2008–2011, a period during which the old code
was in effect and, thus, eviction was difficult.
Based on the 2012 Turkish Statistical Institute figures, there are 20 million households in
Turkey, 13.8 million of which have been residing in urban areas. Among the 20 million
households, the home ownership rate is approximately 57.5 percent and the remaining 42.5
percent are renters. The home ownership rate is around 50.5 percent in urban areas, while it
goes up to 73.4 percent in rural areas. Around 49 percent of all households live in apartments,
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but this rate is as high as 74.5 percent in urban areas. As of 2012, 56.3 percent of the
households still use stove as the main heating system—41.2 percent in urban areas.
Rents are included in the CPI with a weight of 5.45 percent and the overall housing services
(including rents, renovation materials for dwelling, water, electricity, gas, and other fuels)
has a CPI share of approximately 16.4 percent. The share of housing services in household
consumption expenditures is 26 percent and this rate is roughly similar across home owners
and renters. For high-income households, the share of rent expenditures is higher than that
for low-income groups. Housing services have a share of 7.1 percent in the GDP as of 2012—a
little less than 2 percent for rentals.
The rent data that Genesove uses are compiled by the BLS and are used for the purpose of
calculating the rent changes in the US Consumer Price Index. The rent data in the ILCS,
however, do not constitute a base for the rents in the CPI.10 The ILCS panel data suggest
that the rent inflation rates are 10 percent, 6.8 percent, and 7 percent for 2008–09, 2009–
10, and 2010–11, respectively, while the actual rent inflation rates have been 8.2 percent,
4.3 percent, and 4.3 percent for the same periods [see Table (1)]. It seems that the ILCS
somewhat overestimates the rent inflation. The reason for this overestimation is that the
ILCS oversamples the poor—since its main purpose is to understand the income and living
conditions of the low-income households—and rent increases are relatively large in percentage
terms for low-rent units.
3 Descriptive Properties of Yearly Changes in Housing Rents
3.1 Basic Facts on Nominal Rigidities
We start our analysis by matching the consecutive survey years in a pairwise manner. Specif-
ically, we construct three distinct two-year balanced panel datasets. The first one focuses on
those housing units which are occupied by renters both in 2008 and 2009. In this structure,
we can observe the actual rental rate of the same unit both in 2008 and 2009, which allows
10The rent data for CPI are extracted from the Household Budget Survey, which is a cross-sectional dataset and, therefore,
does not allow for the analysis of rent stickiness.
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Figure 3.1: Empirical CDFs of yearly changes in nominal rents.
us to see whether the rent has changed or not over a year. We also observe whether the same
tenant occupies the unit in both years or there is a new tenant in 2009. The same procedure
is followed to construct two additional datasets for 2009–2010 and 2010–2011. The nominal
growth rate of the housing unit’s rent is simply calculated via the formula dr = ln rt− ln rt−1,
where rt is the nominal rent in year t. Figure (3.1) plots the cumulative distribution functions
of dr for these three sets of observations. The vertical portion of each cumulative distribu-
tion—bounded by dashed horizontal reference lines—marks the fraction of housing units with
exactly zero yearly change in rents. Obviously, the degree of nominal rigidity in housing rents
is significant.
Table (1) summarizes the main facts.11 In the entire sample, the incidence of nominal rigidity
in housing rents is 31.5 percent. When we look at the years separately, we see that the
incidence moves in the range of 23.4–33.3 percent. It is interesting to note that the lowest rate
is recorded in 2008–2009, i.e., the crisis period. Clearly, the tendency—measured both in terms
of the mean and median changes—to increase rents is higher in 2008-2009 than the following
periods. This suggests that adjustments in housing rents are more likely to be exercised during
turbulent periods.
The dispersion of yearly rent changes is described by two different statistics: Q3-Q2 and
11The number of observations is increasing over time due to the rotating nature of the dataset.
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2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 All years
Percent negative change 13.5 15.2 14.1 14.3
Percent zero change (nominal rigidity) 23.4 33.3 33.3 31.5
Percent positive change 63.1 51.5 52.6 54.2
Median 0.087 0.022 0.036 0.048
Mean 0.100 0.068 0.070 0.075
Standard deviation 0.204 0.190 0.192 0.194
Q3-Q2 0.113 0.114 0.089 0.095
Turnover rate 0.212 0.216 0.213 0.214
# of observations 628 1168 1672 3468
CPI inflation 0.053 0.083 0.067 –
Rent inflation 0.082 0.043 0.043 –
Table 1: Nominal rigidity, by year.
standard deviation. Following Genesove (2003), we construct the statistic “Q3-Q2,” which
describes the distance between the median and the 75th percentile.12 Genesove argues that
Q3-Q2 is relatively more stable than the standard deviation. For our sample, both the Q3-
Q2 and standard deviation are fairly stable across years. Moreover, there is no significant
relationship between any of these measures and the extent of nominal rigidity in rents.
3.2 Turnover versus Nonturnover Units
Based on year-on-year comparisons, we document that, on average, tenants change in the 21.4
percent of all units in our sample.13 This percentage is quite similar across years. We show
that the incidence of nominal rigidity significantly varies with turnover status. As we report
in Table (2), the incidence is 17.1 percent in turnover units, while it is 35.4 percent (more than
twice) in nonturnover units. In the crisis period, the incidence is only 8.3 percent in turnover
units, whereas it goes up to 27.5 percent (more than three times) in nonturnover units. This
suggests that the increased rate of upward price adjustments during turbulent times is not
due to increased turnover rates, but mostly due to decreased incidence of nominal rigidity in
turnover units.
Figure (3.2) presents a year-on-year comparison of the empirical inverse cumulative distribu-
12Genesove calls this statistic “dispersion.”
13We identify the turnover status from the question “when did you move in?”
10
2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 All years
Percent negative change T 28.1 23.0 21.6 23.5
Percent zero change (nominal rigidity) T 8.3 18.7 19.4 17.1
Percent positive change T 63.6 58.3 59.0 59.4
Mean percentage change T 9.5 11.2 11.2 10.9
Percent negative change N 9.3 13.0 12.0 11.9
Percent zero change (nominal rigidity) N 27.5 37.3 37.1 35.4
Percent positive change N 63.2 49.7 50.9 52.7
Mean percentage change N 10.1 5.7 5.9 6.6
Percent negative change Total 13.5 15.2 14.1 14.3
Percent zero change (nominal rigidity) Total 23.4 33.3 33.3 31.5
Percent positive change Total 63.1 51.5 52.6 54.2
Mean percentage change Total 10.0 6.8 7.0 7.5
Table 2: Nominal rigidity, by year and turnover status.
tions of turnover versus nonturnover units in our sample. The most prominent fact Figure
(3.2) communicates is that, apart from nominal rigidity, the magnitudes of the negative and
positive changes are much smaller in nonturnover units than turnover units. In other words,
continuing tenants are not subject to sharp yearly increases in housing rents relative to new
tenants. The bargaining process can offer an explanation justifying these patterns. To be
precise, bargaining with a continuing tenant may be less cumbersome than bargaining with
a new tenant as it saves time, reduces stress for both parties, and minimizes the information
acquisition costs [Genesove (2003)]. These pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs jointly make the
nominal price at time t−1 a good proxy for determining the nominal rent at time t. Formally
speaking, an ex post surplus emerges as a consequence of the bargaining between the landlord
and tenant. This surplus will also be a function of the costs mentioned above. The existence
of these costs smooths out the price changes—in both directions—for the continuing tenants.
3.3 Unit Size and Building Type
Genesove (2003) finds that nominal rigidity is less pronounced for units in small buildings than
in large ones. He argues that building size proxies the landlord size. The cost of acquiring
information is potentially smaller for larger landlords. The easiest way to understand the main
idea is to think in terms of fixed costs. If there are fixed costs associated with information
11
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
Ch
an
ge
 in
 re
nt
s
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Cumulative probability
Turnover Non-turnover
2008-2009
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
Ch
an
ge
 in
 re
nt
s
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Cumulative probability
Turnover Non-turnover
2009-2010
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
Ch
an
ge
 in
 re
nt
s
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Cumulative probability
Turnover Non-turnover
2010-2011
Figure 3.2: Empirical inverse CDFs of yearly changes in nominal rents, by turnover status.
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Neg. change (%) Zero change (%) Pos. change (%) # of obs.
1 25.0 20.8 54.2 24
2 15.7 25.2 59.1 318
3 14.0 31.8 54.2 1619
4 14.4 32.8 52.8 1414
5 11.3 28.2 60.5 70
≥ 6 13.6 40.9 45.5 23
Total 14.3 31.5 54.2 3468
Table 3: Nominal rigidity, by unit size (# of rooms excluding kitchen, bathroom, and toilets).
Neg. change (%) Zero change (%) Pos. change (%) # of obs.
25–50 14.3 29.8 55.9 84
51–70 16.5 26.2 57.3 412
71–90 14.2 31.2 54.6 1176
91–110 13.7 35.2 51.1 923
111–130 13.7 30.6 56.3 586
131–150 17.6 30.3 52.1 165
≥151 12.6 33.6 53.8 122
Total 14.3 31.5 54.2 3468
Table 4: Nominal rigidity, by unit size (square meters).
acquisition, then landlords owning multiple housing units will be more willing to pay the cost
than those owning a single unit. This result is reasonable for the US, because there are many
large real estate firms in the rental market and it sounds realistic to think that the units rented
by them are probably subject to a smaller incidence of rigidity.
In Turkey, however, the rental market is not dominated by professionals unlike the US. Housing
is widely regarded as an investment good (or an insurance) by the households. Because of
this reason, we mostly see individual landlords bargaining with the tenant directly rather than
salaried professionals. Given this fact, our ex ante expectation is that the link between rigidity
and unit size or building type should be weaker in Turkey. To detect these links, we present
simple cross tabulations of rigidity across units of different sizes and units in different building
types. Table (3) and Table (4) summarize the incidence of rigidity for units of differing sizes.
Unit size is measured in two ways in our dataset: (1) by the number of rooms excluding
kitchen, bathroom, and toilets and (2) by square meters. We find weak evidence that larger
units—both in terms of the number of rooms and square meters—are more likely to exhibit
13
Neg. change (%) Zero change (%) Pos. change (%) # of obs.
Detached 13.2 30.2 56.6 805
Semi-detached 13.0 22.3 64.7 139
Building <10 units 13.8 32.1 54.1 1501
Building ≥10 units 16.3 33.1 50.6 1023
Total 14.3 31.5 54.2 3468
Table 5: Nominal rigidity, by building type.
no change in rents.14 This is contrary to Genesove’s finding.
Table (5) documents the link between rigidity and building type. The Income and Living
Conditions Survey groups units under four categories: detached units, semi-detached units,
buildings with less than 10 units, and buildings with 10 units and above. A simple eyeball
test reveals that there is no significant relationship between the incidence of nominal rigidity
and building type. Again, this result does not support Genesove’s claim. We believe that the
discrepancy between Genesove’s results and ours is due to the differences in the ownership
structure between the US and Turkey.
To summarize, we find that the degree of nominal rigidity is significant in Turkey; that is, a
nonnegligible fraction of housing rents do not change yearly. We also show that this rigidity
is more pronounced for nonturnover units. The magnitudes are in line with those reported for
the US by Genesove (2003). We also show that, unlike the US case, the unit size and building
type variables do not offer a systematic explanation but standard bargaining theories seem
to hold for the Turkish case. Next we dig deeper into the micro foundations of the nominal
rigidity in housing rents in Turkey by exploiting the micro-level details that our dataset offers.
4 Explaining Nominal Rigidities in Rents
4.1 Grid Pricing
One potential explanation for the observed nominal rigidity in housing rents is that there is a
tendency to price on a grid, i.e., prices tend to be rounded to the multiples of, say, X. In that
14We also find that the tradeoff is mostly between the negative change and no change categories; that is, the degree of nominal
rigidity increases with unit size, while the percentage of declining rents decreases with unit size.
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Grids Whole sample Turnover Non-turnover
100 35.2 32.4 35.9
50 29.1 32.0 28.3
25 7.9 7.9 7.9
10 24.4 24.1 24.4
5 2.3 2.4 2.2
1 1.2 1.1 1.2
Table 6: Raw grid points, percentage.
case, when a shock necessitates raising the price by Y , where Y < X, this will either lead to
a zero change or a change by X. This mechanism can itself generate rigidity in rents to some
extent. In this subsection, we use the method proposed by Genesove (2003) to estimate the
extent to which grid pricing is associated with nominal rigidity in housing rents in Turkey.
Table (6) provides summary information on grids over the whole sample and for turnover versus
nonturnover units separately. The table should be read as follows. In the whole sample, 35.2
percent of the rents are multiples of 100, 29.1 percent are multiples of 50 (but not 100), 7.9
percent are multiples of 25 (but not 50 and 100), 24.4 percent are multiples of 10 (but not
50 and 100), and 2.3 percent are multiples of 5 (but not 10, 25, 50, and 100). The remaining
1.2 percent are multiples of 1 (but not 5, 10, 25, 50, and 100). Observe that these patterns
are preserved for turnover and nonturnover units, except that nonturnover units slightly have
more rounding to 100 and less rounding to 50 than turnover units. The table suggests that
grid pricing is present and it is significant.
Figure (4.1) plots the probability distribution of rents as a histogram. The line plot is a
standard Kernel density estimate. We make two observations. First, the rent distribution
exhibits a certain degree of bi-modality; that is, there are two peaks in the distribution—one
is around the overall mean of the distribution (approximately 312 Turkish liras per month)
and the other is around 500 Turkish liras per month (there is significant bunching at the
levels of 450, 500, and 550). The latter peak itself signals the existence of grid pricing in rent
determination. Second, the grid intervals specified in Table (6) are not too large or too small
with respect to the observed rent distribution.
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Dependent variable: Rigidity dummy
Whole sample Turnover Non-turnover Whole sample
Year Dummies
2008–09 omitted omitted omitted omitted
2009–10 0.288*** 0.511*** 0.272*** 0.283***
(0.069) (0.195) (0.075) (0.069)
2010–11 0.273*** 0.533*** 0.249*** 0.265***
(0.065) (0.187) (0.072) (0.066)
Grid Points
1&5 omitted omitted omitted omitted
10 0.421** 4.038*** 0.377** 0.417**
(0.166) (0.168) (0.175) (0.166)
25 0.595*** 4.034*** 0.577*** 0.586***
(0.179) (0.272) (0.190) (0.179)
50 0.923*** 4.803*** 0.865*** 0.913***
(0.163) (0.146) (0.173) (0.164)
100 1.039*** 4.802*** 0.982*** 1.026***
(0.162) (0.141) (0.171) (0.163)
Unit Size (Square Meters)
≥ 151 omitted omitted omitted omitted
131–150 -0.037 -0.893* 0.091 -0.034
(0.160) (0.467) (0.175) (0.161)
111–130 -0.008 0.030 0.015 0.018
(0.134) (0.337) (0.147) (0.135)
91–110 0.140 -0.041 0.184 0.152
(0.130) (0.327) (0.143) (0.132)
71–90 0.021 -0.146 0.069 0.034
(0.129) (0.324) (0.142) (0.131)
51–70 -0.086 -0.239 -0.035 -0.066
(0.143) (0.354) (0.148) (0.145)
25–50 0.053 -0.665 0.170 0.081
(0.198) (0.646) (0.215) (0.200)
Building Type
Semi-detached omitted omitted omitted omitted
Detached 0.269** 0.275 0.277* 0.275**
(0.129) (0.363) (0.142) (0.129)
Building < 10 units 0.194 0.059 0.216 0.178
(0.126) (0.357) (0.138) (0.127)
Building ≥ 10 units 0.196 0.130 0.206 0.170
(0.129) (0.365) (0.142) (0.132)
Log of nom. rents – – – 0.047
(0.056)
Constant -1.743*** -5.940*** -1.631*** -1.992***
(0.241) (0.490) (0.262) (0.388)
Φ–restricted 0.103 0.001 0.133 0.099
Φ–unrestricted 0.321 0.182 0.357 0.318
Log likelihood -2,044 -299 -1,690 -2,044
N 3,403 701 2,702 3,403
Table 7: Nominal rigidity, grid pricing: probit regression.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of rents.
To estimate the extent to which grid pricing tends to correlate with the degree of nominal
rigidity in rents, we run a probit regression as described by Genesove (2003). First, we
construct a dummy variable “rigidity” taking 1 if the rent has not changed over the year
and 0 otherwise. This binary rigidity variable will be our dependent variable in the probit
regression. The explanatory variables are: year dummies, the dummy variables for grids,
dummy variables for unit size, dummies for building type, and the natural logarithm of the
nominal rent level. The 2008–2009, the lowest grid (in which we collapse 1 and 5), the largest
unit, and the semi-detached building dummies are omitted. We report our estimates in Table
(7). The first and fourth columns use the whole sample, and the second and third use turnover
and nonturnover units, respectively. “Φ–unrestricted” is the predicted probability of rigidity
and “Φ–restricted” is the predicted probability after restricting all of the grid dummies to
be zero. Thus, the difference between the two can be attributed to the explanatory power
of grid pricing. Our analysis suggests that around 68 percent of the nominal rigidity tend to
be related to grid pricing over the whole sample. This is much higher than the grid pricing
tendency in the US estimated by Genesove, as he finds that a little less than half of the nominal
rigidity can be attributed to grid pricing. We find that grid pricing is associated with almost
100 percent of the nominal rigidity in turnover units and around 63 percent in nonturnover
units in the sample. This means that the factors leading to rigid nominal rents other than
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1 5 10 25 50 100
1 14 1 5 3 6 11
1 0 1 1 0 2
5 1 17 19 8 16 18
1 8 7 1 5 3
10 4 8 397 40 184 212
0 2 107 6 40 54
25 2 12 31 78 75 73
1 2 8 42 36 35
50 4 14 163 72 427 307
0 3 52 35 225 168
100 6 15 190 75 286 609
1 6 75 45 167 380
Table 8: Transition matrix for grid points: number of transitions.
grid pricing are only relevant for nonturnover units.
It is reasonable to think that the tendency of setting housing rents on the grids might be larger
at higher rent levels. If this is the case, then one should expect that adding the level of nominal
rents into the regression would reduce the explanatory power of grid pricing. In the fourth
column of Table (7), we repeat our whole-sample regression by adding the natural logarithm
of the nominal rent level as a regressor. The nominal rent level as a regressor does not change
our original results; that is, grid pricing is still associated with more than 65 percent of the
nominal rigidity.15 We see a positive coefficient on the rent level, but it is not statistically
significant. This suggests that accounting for the idea that the tendency of rigidity might be
a function of the rent level does not seem to hold in our analysis.
Taken at the face value, these results mean that grid pricing is likely a dominant factor in
rent determination and the housing unit characteristics such as unit size and building type
15The results of the separate regressions for turnover and nonturnover units are also not affected from the inclusion of the
nominal rent level as a regressor.
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have almost no role in explaining the rigidity tendency. That said, there is still one source
of potential non-robustness in our results that needs further investigation: the omitted grid
category (i.e., 1 & 5) represents only 3 percent of the observations in our dataset. If the units
in the omitted category are less likely to exhibit rigidity, the role of grid pricing might have
been overestimated in our regressions.16 The notable differences between the coefficients for
the turnover versus nonturnover units also reinforce these concerns.
To check for the validity and robustness of our estimates, we construct a simple transition
matrix to observe how rent changes evolve across the grids [see Table (8)]. The rows of the
matrix refer to the initial state and the columns refer to the destination state. The numbers
in each cell correspond to the aggregate number of transitioning units in our sample. For
example, the number of units transitioning from the 100-grid to 50-grid is 286. The non-
transitioning units are given on the diagonal in bold characters. The second entry in each cell
describe the number of units that are above the average nominal rent level, where the average
is calculated across all rental units in the corresponding survey year. For example, among the
286 units that are transitioning from the 100-grid to 50-grid, 167 of them occur in units with
above-average rental payments.
The transition matrix reveals that around half of the rental units in our sample rotate across
the 50–100 grids (i.e., the two-by-two sub-matrix on the lower-right partition indicated in red
color). We call these the “type-1” units. The rest of the units are somehow related to the
smaller grids and we call those units the “type-2” units. The transitions basically say that grid
pricing is important; thus, our results regarding the significance of grid pricing seem robust
based on an eyeball test.
Two more concerns remain: the impact of the rent level and other unit characteristics on the
tendency of grid pricing. It is clear from the transition matrix that the rent level has some
role to play, although the regression results in the column 4 of Table (7) say the opposite.
Specifically, for type-1 units, approximately 58 percent of the transitions occur across high-rent
16However, this does not mean that our approach is technically wrong. Our regressions reflect a comparison between the
tendency to set prices on grids versus non-grids. Genesove (2003) adopts a similar strategy, but his omitted category is around
10 percent of his sample, which is reasonably high.
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Dependent variable: Rigidity dummy
Type-1 Type-2
Year Dummies
2008–09 omitted omitted
2009–10 0.312*** 0.423***
(0.109) (0.156)
2010–11 0.324*** 0.429***
(0.102) (0.151)
Unit Size (Square Meters)
≥ 151 omitted omitted
131–150 -0.021 -0.611
(0.118) (0.501)
111–130 0.101 -0.042
(0.121) (0.291)
91–110 0.193* -0.134
(0.096) (0.298)
71–90 0.101 -0.221
(0.121) (0.309)
51–70 -0.003 -0.417
(0.154) (0.387)
25–50 0.043 -0.712**
(0.124) (0.301)
Building Type
Semi-detached omitted omitted
Detached 0.316*** 0.212
(0.098) (0.332)
Building < 10 units 0.294 0.112
(0.243) (0.401)
Building ≥ 10 units 0.169 0.201
(0.223) (0.299)
Log of nom. rents 0.045** 0.041
(0.019) (0.047)
Constant -2.230*** -3.686***
(0.203) (0.433)
Log likelihood -1,823 -1,543
N 1,629 1,774
Table 9: Nominal rigidity, grid pricing: separate probit regressions for type-1 versus type-2
units over the whole sample.
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units, while only around 33 percent of the type-2 transitions are realized across high-rent units.
This suggests that differences in the rent change rates across type-1 and type-2 units might,
to some extent, be mechanically related to the rent level, which implies that high-rent units
tend to change rents less frequently. To investigate whether the role of unit characteristics
on the tendency of rent rigidity differs across type-1 versus type-2 units, we run two separate
probit regressions of the rigidity dummy on year, unit size, and building type dummies. Table
(9) presents the estimates. The results suggest that unit characteristics still do not have much
explanatory power. That said, we see that smaller type-2 units are less likely, while medium-
size type-1 units are more likely to have rigid rents. Building type seems to have no systematic
impact on the incidence of rigidity.
Overall, we conclude that grid pricing is likely an important determinant of nominal rigidity in
housing rents in the Turkish market. The level of rents do not seem to have a significant effect
on the incidence of rigidity in the aggregate regressions. However, a simple transition-matrix
approach reveal that there is a group of units transitioning across 50–100 grids (type-1 units),
others transitioning across the remaining grids (type-2 units), and type-1 units are more likely
to be high-rent units than the type-2 units. Further analysis yields the result that, for type-1
units, the level of rents positively effects the incidence of rigidity. This means that, in the
high-rent units, rents are adjusted less frequently; but, when they are adjusted, they are set
at the largest grid levels such as 50 or 100. We also find that unit characteristics such as unit
size (in terms of the number of rooms and/or area of the unit) or building type (detached,
semi-detached, large/small buildings) do not have a strong effect on rigidity.
4.2 Characteristics of the Household Head
In this subsection, we match the unit-level data with the individual-level details. Following
the conventions in the applied work on household-level data, we focus on the characteristics of
the household head. Our main purpose is to investigate whether the observed characteristics
of the household head is in a systematic relationship with the observed nominal rigidity in
housing rents. We perform this task in two steps. First, we directly use the rigidity dummy as
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our dependent variable. Based on our findings in Section 2, which basically say that turnover
is critical for the incidence of rigidity, we investigate the micro-level determinants of turnover
behavior at the second step. Our main focus is to document basic correlations—rather than
causal relationships—between the individual-level variables and the unit-level outcomes.
4.2.1 Rigidity Tendency
We have details on the annual income, employment status, education level, and age of the
household head. The annual income contains the income from all sources during the survey
year and we use the natural logarithm of annual income in our regressions. Following the
conventions in the empirical labor economics literature, we describe the employment status of
the household head with three dummy variables: employed, unemployed, and not in labor force
(NILF). As for the education level of the household head, we construct 6 dummy variables:
no degree, primary school, secondary school, high school, vocational high school, and college
& above. We include the age of the household head into our regressions as a quadratic
polynomial to capture the potential nonlinearities over the life-cycle. The “rigidity” dummy
is our dependent variable. We focus only on the “nonturnover” units, because running this
regression only makes sense for those units having the same tenant in two consecutive years.
Because income, employment status, and education are clearly endogenous, we run three
separate regressions using only one of them in each regression. We also include year dummies,
unit size dummies, building type dummies, region dummies (at the NUTS1 level), a dummy
variable indicating whether the unit is located in an urban versus rural area, a dummy variable
for marital status (taking 1 if the household head is married and 0 if nonmarried), and the
number of individuals residing in the unit.17 We run a probit regression and we report the
marginal effects along with robust standard errors.
17The publicly available panel dataset of the Income and Living Conditions Survey has no information on the location of the
housing units for confidentiality purposes. There is also a cross-sectional module of the same survey, which provides two types
of location information: region (at the NUTS1 level) and urban/rural status of the housing unit. Observations in the panel
dataset is a subset of the observations in the cross-sectional module; however, there is no panel identifier in the cross-sectional
dataset. That said, it is still possible to produce a synthetic panel identifier. We create a new unit ID number using the same
unit characteristics both in the cross-sectional and panel modules. This new ID number is uniquely matched across the two
datasets. Note that similar techniques are used to utilize the hidden panel dimension of the Current Population Survey (CPS)
data in the US, which is originally a cross-sectional data set [see, e.g., Fujita and Ramey (2009)]. Note also that, based on the
NUTS1 classification, Turkey consists of 12 broad regions: (1) Istanbul, (2) West Marmara, (3) Aegean, (4) East Marmara, (5)
West Anatolia, (6) Mediterranean, (7) Central Anatolia, (8) West Black Sea, (9) East Black Sea, (10) North East Anatolia, (11)
Middle East Anatolia, and (12) South East Anatolia.
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Dependent variable: Rigidity
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Unit size dummies Yes Yes Yes
Building type dummies Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes
Location dummy Yes Yes Yes
Family Variables
Married -0.033* -0.008 -0.038*
(0.018) (0.023) (0.019)
# of HH members 0.003 0.001 -0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Age (of HH head) 0.0026 0.0018 0.0021
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Age2/100 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log income -0.0027** – –
(0.001)
Employment Status
NILF – omitted –
Unemployed – -0.031 –
(0.046)
Employed – -0.077** –
(0.032)
Education
No degree – – omitted
Primary school – – 0.018
(0.051)
Secondary school – – 0.014
(0.055)
High school – – 0.035
(0.057)
Voc. high school – – 0.009
(0.052)
College & above – – -0.059
(0.054)
N 2,702 2,702 2,702
Table 10: Nominal rigidity, individual-level determinants: probit regression, marginal ef-
fects, nonturnover units.
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Our estimates are reported in Table (10). The first column says that a 10 percent increase in
the yearly income of the household head reduces the probability of rigidity by 2.7 percentage
points in nonturnover units. The second column suggests that the probability of rigidity is
7.7 percent lower when the household head is employed, while being unemployed does not
have a statistically significant effect on rigidity. The third column says that the probability of
rigidity does not depend on the education level of the household head. Although the education
coefficients are statistically insignificant, their signs suggest that the probability of rigidity is
lowest when the household head has a college education or other graduate-level degrees. We
also find that being married reduces the probability of rigidity by around 3.5 percentage points.
The age of the household head does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability
of rigidity.
Although we do not report the regression outcomes for the regional/locational dummies, we
think that it is worthwhile to comment on the estimates. Note that we only observe regions
at the NUTS1 level [see Footnote (17)] and the location of the unit as urban versus rural.
We do not observe the exact city/jurisdiction size. However, we observe a sharp geographical
pattern in the data: the incidence of nominal rigidity in housing rents is smaller in developed
areas—i.e., the regions containing the large metropolitan areas in Turkey such as Istanbul,
Ankara, and Izmir—than less developed areas. Moreover, we find that the incidence of rigidity
is lower in urban areas than rural areas. Region-level indicators are important in the analysis
of rental markets. In the context of our analysis, regional variation in the tightness of the
rental market—where tightness is defined as the number of available rental units divided by
the number of households actively seeking rental units—might be an important factor deter-
mining the degree of nominal rigidity in rents. For example, some regions (such as Istanbul,
Mediterranean area, Aegean area, etc) are subject to a large volume of immigration, which
can increase the demand for rental units and tighten the rental market.18 Unfortunately, we
do not have indicators to measure rental market tightness directly, as this requires a different
type of data. Still, we believe that region and location dummies can, to some extent, capture
18Theoretically speaking, supply will also respond in this case. However, changes in housing supply is a longer-term phe-
nomenon. Given that our analysis captures a time interval of four years, it is reasonable to think that housing supply is
approximately fixed in this argument.
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the regional differences in rental market tightness. Our results suggest that the incidence of
rigidity is lower in tighter rental markets, i.e., in more developed regions and in urban areas.
We perform our regressions both with and without region/location dummies; in both cases,
the coefficients for unit characteristics have no explanatory power. This suggests that our
estimates that rigidity is lower in more developed urban areas is potentially due to differences
in rental market tightness rather than regional differences in unit characteristics.
Overall, the main messages that this regression communicates are as follows. When the income
level is high—either measured directly or proxied by employment status and education—we
see that the probability of rigidity is low. This might mean that high-income households have
higher opportunity costs and, therefore, they are more willing to stay in the same unit in
case of a positive rent shock, rather than seeking a replacement. We will complement these
arguments with the analysis presented below.
4.2.2 Turnover Status
The turnover status deserves special attention, since it is a critical determinant of nominal
rigidity in housing rents. Our descriptive analysis in Section 3 reveals that the incidence of
rigidity among nonturnover units is more than twice of the incidence among turnover units.
Then, the critical question is: what explains turnover behavior? We construct a dummy
variable “turnover” taking 1 if the unit has changed tenants and 0 otherwise. We then perform
a probit regression similar to the one described above. Table (11) documents the marginal
effects.
We find that a 10 percent increase in the yearly income of the household head reduces turnover
probability by 2.3 percentage points. We also show that the only significant employment status
dummy is the one for “employed” and it suggests that units with an employed household head
are 6.5 percent less likely to change units. For education, although the dummy variable for
high-school graduation is statistically significant, we do not see any systematic relationship
between turnover behavior and the education level of the household head. We also find that
the turnover probability declines with the age of the household head. In particular, increasing
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Dependent variable: Turnover
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Unit size dummies Yes Yes Yes
Building type dummies Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes
Location dummy Yes Yes Yes
Family Variables
Married -0.039* -0.048** -0.038*
(0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
# of HH members -0.014* -0.014* -0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age (of HH head) -0.0011* -0.0011*** -0.0010***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Age2/100 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Log income -0.0023*** – –
(0.0008)
Employment Status
NILF – omitted –
Unemployed – -0.027 –
(0.041)
Employed – -0.065*** –
(0.023)
Education
No degree – – omitted
Primary school – – 0.022
(0.035)
Secondary school – – 0.049
(0.039)
High school – – 0.081*
(0.044)
Voc. high school – – 0.031
(0.039)
College & above – – 0.021
(0.038)
N 3,403 3,403 3,403
Table 11: Turnover, individual-level determinants: probit regression, marginal effects.
the age of the household head by 1 year reduces the probability of turnover by around 1.1
percentage points.19 Unlike our results for the rigidity probability, we find that the region
and location of the rental units do not have a statistically significant effect on the incidence
of turnover.
Thinking together with our results in Section 4.2.1, we find that high income and employment
19There are several papers in the literature arguing that housing mobility is higher for younger individuals and the turnover
probability goes down with age. For example, Halket and Vasudev (2013) show that the incidence of turnover goes down as life-
cycle income and family size uncertainties are resolved. Smith, Rayer, Smith, Wang, and Zeng (2012) document that disability
rates increase with age and this leads to a reduction in turnover probability at old ages. There are other papers showing that this
tendency may exhibit cross-country variation. For example, Banks, Blundell, Oldfield, and Smith (2010) find that, in the United
States, the turnover probability might be high at old ages due to desire to be closer to children/grandchildren, to live in a warmer
winter climate, or to reduce the cost of living, while in the United Kingdom housing turnover is quite low for older people.
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reduces both the turnover probability and the probability of rigidity among the nonturnover
units. This seems contradictory, but the “opportunity cost” argument explains these estimates
jointly; that is, high-income households have higher opportunity costs and, thus, they tend
to exhibit nonturnover behavior and once they choose to stay in the unit that they currently
live, they are more likely to adjust their rents on a yearly basis.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the degree of nominal rigidity in housing rents using data from
the Turkish Income and Living Conditions Longitudinal Survey between 2008 and 2011. We
document that the degree of nominal rigidity in rents is significant. Specifically, we find that,
on average, 31.5 percent of the rents in Turkey do not change on a yearly basis. Although the
tendency for inflation indexation is expected to be strong in Turkey due to the hyperinflation
experience in the near history, it is interesting to observe that nearly one third of the rents
remain unchanged from year to year. This is comparable to the estimates reported for the
US, which is 29 percent.
Although the existing research on the extent of rent rigidity is informative, the mechanisms
offered in this literature to explain rigid rents are not equally clear. One of the innovative
features of this paper is that we utilize the micro-level details offered in our dataset to under-
stand the behavioral foundations of rigid rents. Specifically, we document that high-income
households are less likely to change units frequently. On the other hand, when they choose not
to change units, they are less likely to have rigid rents. This mechanism suggests that search
and moving costs impose frictions that amplify the opportunity costs of high-income tenants;
thus, they are more likely to agree on reasonable rent increases each year for the purpose of
saving time and reducing emotional stress. Additional empirical research is needed to test the
existing hypotheses and propose new ones.
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